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Abstract
Hyperbolic discounting models are widely seen as implying that consumers
do not save enough, in accordance with the observed low rates of savings of
some households. This paper quali…es this statement by showing that hy-
perbolic consumers may ’oversave’ in the short run. The result extends to
uncertainty on future income and does not depend on whether preferences are
present-biased or future-biased. A generalized comparative statics analysis of
self-control is introduced, and its relationship to the analysis of uncertainty
on future discount rates is emphasized.
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1 Introduction
It is often suggested that consumers’ lack of self-control may explain under-
savings patterns observed in western societies. This suggestion has found
recent support in the hyperbolic discounting literature. Quasi-hyperbolic
preferences in each period t can be written as
u(ct) + ¯
T¡tX
i=1
±iu(ct+i);
where the parameter ¯ · 1 represents the ’bias for the present’. Various
papers have shown that hyperbolic consumers (or ¯ < 1) save less than
exponential (or ¯ = 1) consumers (Laibson, 1997, 1998, Harris and Laibson,
2001, Angeletos et al., 2001, Diamond and Koszegi, 2003). This literature
thus predicts that the lack of self-control induced by hyperbolic discounting
leads to undersavings.1
Notwithstanding the merits of the hyperbolic discounting literature to
explain a wide range of empirical anomalies, the present paper quali…es this
prediction. A crucial starting point is to recognize that comparing expo-
nential and hyperbolic consumers is not an appropriate comparative statics
1This prediction dates back to the early literature on hyberbolic discounting. Phelps
and Pollack (1968) showed that time-inconsistency must yield undersaving, in the sense
that the agent without self-control would be better o¤ at any period if he could save a bit
more at all periods. This result relies on the fact that a time-inconsistent agent cannot
commit to a consumption path at the beginning of the game he plays with future “selves”.
For a much larger class of preferences, Goldman (1979) proved a similar result: all selves
would be better-o¤ if self-1 saved more and transferred this extra-savings to a well-chosen
future self. However, as Goldman recognized, “(t)his phenomenon of over-consumption,
as described above, does not preclude the existence of other Pareto superior solutions in
which the …rst generation’s consumption is increased” (Goldman, 1979, p.624).
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analysis to isolate the e¤ect of self-control. Indeed, within a model with
quasi-hyperbolic preferences, the parameter ¯ plays two roles. First, it indi-
cates whether there is a self-control problem (¯ < 1) or not (¯ = 1). Second,
it modi…es the whole sequence of discount factors. A lower ¯ reduces discount
factors for all subsequent periods. It is thus not surprising that reducing ¯
has been found to reduce savings.
In this paper, we instead propose to measure self-control as the ability
to commit to a future consumption path. Consequently we argue that the
right comparison should be performed between a consumer with commitment
power and a consumer without it. In a simple three-period model, we show
that the e¤ect of self-control on savings critically depends on the curvature
of the consumer’s instantaneous utility function. Besides, under standard
assumptions on this curvature, less self-control should lead to oversaving
instead of undersaving.2 Furthermore, the e¤ect of more or less self-control
does not depend on whether the agent’s preferences display a “bias for the
present” or not.
We also generalize our analysis to any model in which an agent must
sequentially take two decisions. Within such a general model, we show that
the e¤ect of more self-control on the …rst-period decision is qualitatively
2Pollack (1968) and more recently Barro (1999) perform the same comparison and
notice that the degree of self-control has no e¤ect on savings, when the instantaneous utility
function is logarithmic. Indeed our results show that the logarithmic case is a knife-edge
case. O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a, 1999b) also proceed to this comparison in investment
decision models and principal-agent models. Here we focus on a pure consumption model,
with general utility functions.
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similar to the e¤ect of introducing uncertainty on future discount factors.3
This allows us to provide an interpretation of our results in terms of an
income and a substitution e¤ect, exactly as done in the precautionary savings
literature (Drèze and Modigliani, 1972).
In contrast to the hyperbolic discounting approach, Gul and Pesendorfer
(2001, 2004) rely on an axiomatic basis to de…ne the notions of self-control
and temptation. Their representation theorems show that a decision-maker
may experience costs associated to self-control. The agent chooses a dif-
ferent consumption in period 2 depending on whether decision takes place
in period 1 or 2. In the hyperbolic discounting approach, this is because
preferences change over time; ex-ante commitment permits to constrain the
future self. By contrast Gul and Pesendorfer postulate that temptation and
costly self-control are experienced only in period 2. Hence commitment is
valued because it reduces temptation during the period 2’s decision process.
What is the e¤ect of self-control on early savings in the Gul and Pesendor-
fer’s framework? Gul and Pesendorfer (2004, Proposition 2) show that in a
stationary in…nite-horizon equilibrium an agent with more costly self-control
consumes less. In contrast, in a two-period model, an agent with a tempta-
tion utility would reduce his savings in period 1 (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2002).4
3This relates to an emerging literature on uncertain discount rates. Sozou (1998) used
uncertainty on future discount rates to show how hyperbolic discounting preferences may
emerge from otherwise standard preferences. Dasgupta and Maskin (2002) extends Sozou’s
model to introduce both uncertainty on the timing of the rewards and a waiting cost.
4In short, the consumer maximizes u(c1) + v(c1) ¡ v(w) + ±u(w ¡ c1) where v is the
temptation utility, w is the available income and v(w) ¡ v(c1) is interpreted as the cost
of exercising self-control. When v = 0, self-control has no cost. When v is increasing,
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This raises the question of the e¤ect of self-control in a three-period model
similar to that we analyze in this paper. In fact, one can easily show that
self-control leads to under-savings provided the temptation utility function is
convex.5 This result stands in contrast to the over-savings pattern induced
by hyperbolic discounting that we emphasize in this paper.
2 The Model
The interplay between savings and self-control has been analyzed for a long
time (Strotz, 1956), using the following framework. An agent chooses a con-
sumption plan for present and future periods given an intertemporal budget
constraint. However his preferences may change over time. Formally, the
marginal rate of substitution between consumptions in two given future pe-
riods depends on the period at which it is computed. To see that, let us
simply consider a three-period hyperbolic discounting model. In period 1
preferences are
u(c1) + ¯±u(c2) + ¯±2u(c3); (1)
while in period 2 preferences are written as
u(c2) + ¯±u(c3): (2)
The discount factor between period 3 and period 2 is ± if it is computed
at period 1 and ¯± if it is computed at period 2. Thus the consumer is
consumption increases due to the term v0(c1).
5Proof available from the authors upon request.
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dynamically inconsistent as soon as ¯ di¤ers from 1. When ¯ = 1, we are
back to the case of a dynamically consistent consumer, with exponential
discounting.
One may now distinguish two types of consumers. The sophisticated con-
sumer chooses c1 to maximize (1), knowing that in period 2 the consumption
levels c2 and c3 will be chosen by his future self with preferences given by
(2). Hence the sophisticate has no commitment power. The literature usu-
ally compares the sophisticate’s behavior to the behavior of the exponential
consumer with ¯ = 1. Our point here is that changing the value of ¯ not only
changes the degree of self-control, but also the whole structure of discount
factors; this renders the comparison irrelevant.
Instead we propose to compare the sophisticate’s behavior to the behav-
ior of an agent with the same preferences as in (1), and who can commit at
period 1 to his whole consumption path (c1, c2, c3). In this sense, we isolate
the pure e¤ect of self-control. Notice that this agent also chooses c1 in period
1 exactly as if he ignored the self-control problem characterized in (2). As it
is customary in the literature (see, e.g., O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999a), we
shall therefore call him the naive consumer.
To perform the comparison between the naive and the sophisticate con-
sumer, it is actually useful to introduce a slightly more general model. Pref-
5
erences at the beginning of period 1 are given by
u1(c1) + u2(c2) + ¹u3(c3); (3)
where u1, u2 and u3 are assumed to be increasing, strictly concave and three
times di¤erentiable. At the beginning of period 2, preferences change and
become
u2(c2) + ¸u3(c3); (4)
so that these preferences match period 1’s preferences if and only if ¸ = ¹.
Present-biased (resp. future-biased) preferences are characterized by ¸ < ¹
(resp. ¸ > ¹).
Observe that the hyperbolic discounting model (1, 2) may be obtained
from (3, 4) by choosing
u3 = u2 = ¯±u u1 = u
and
¸ = ¯± ¹ = ±:
In the following, we shall vary ¸, keeping ¹ constant; this exactly amounts
to vary ¯ in (2), keeping constant the weights in (1). We thus isolate the
self-control e¤ect of ¯ from its discounting e¤ect.
Let us now introduce the budget constraint as
w ¸ R2c1 +Rc2 + c3;
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where w is the future value of the ‡ow of revenues and R is one plus the
risk-free rate. In this economy, the consumption levels chosen by the naive
are simply characterized by
u01(c1) = Ru
0
2(c2) = R
2¹u03(c3); (5)
together with a binding budget constraint. On the other hand, the sophis-
ticate consumer anticipates that consumption in period 2 will be chosen to
maximize (4). The unique solution c2(c1; ¸) is characterized by
u02(c2(c1; ¸)) = ¸Ru
0
3(w ¡R2c1 ¡Rc2(c1; ¸)): (6)
As a result, the sophisticate consumer plays a Stackelberg game with his
period 2 self, and his optimal level of consumption in period 1 solves6
max
c1
u1(c1) + u2(c2(c1; ¸)) + ¹u3(w ¡R2c1 ¡Rc2(c1; ¸)): (7)
Notice that the naive agent in fact solves the same program, but with ¸ =
¹. Therefore comparing the sophisticate and naive’s …rst period consumption
reduces to a comparative statics exercise with respect to ¸: how does the
solution to program (7) vary when ¸ varies?
3 The Main Result
To answer this question, we use the monotone comparative statics approach
(Milgrom and Shannon, 1994). It is direct that a su¢cient condition for c1
6Existence of a solution is proven under weak conditions in Goldman (1980) in a general
time-inconsistent preferences framework. Here, the conditions reduce to assuming that
consumption is bounded from below.
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to increase in ¸ is that the cross-derivative of the objective with respect to
c1 and ¸ is positive. Let us …rst compute the derivative of the objective in
(7) with respect to ¸. We get
[u02(c2(c1; ¸)) ¡ ¹Ru03(w ¡R2c1 ¡Rc2(c1; ¸))]@c2@¸ (c1; ¸):
By using (6), the bracketed term reduces to
R(¸¡ ¹)u03(w ¡R2c1 ¡Rc2(c1; ¸)):
Using (6) again, we obtain that
@c2
@¸
(c1; ¸) =
Ru03(w ¡R2c1 ¡Rc2(c1; ¸))
u002(c2(c1; ¸)) + ¸R2u003(w ¡R2c1 ¡Rc2(c1; ¸)) :
Therefore the derivative of the objective in (7) with respect to ¸ has the same
sign as
(¸¡ ¹)
·
u023 (w ¡R2c1 ¡Rc2(c1; ¸))
u002(c2(c1; ¸)) + ¸R2u003(w ¡R2c1 ¡Rc2(c1; ¸))
¸
´ (¸¡ ¹)X:
Notice that X is negative under risk aversion. Hence, as ¸ moves away
from ¹, the value for the objective function is reduced. The intuition for that
observation is straightforward. Self-1 su¤ers from a loss in self-control, that
is a radial increase in ¸.
The problem reduces now to examining a single-crossing property, i.e.
the sign of (¸¡¹)@X=@c1. Suppose indeed that @X=@c1 be positive, for any
¸. Then the cross-derivative would have the sign of ¸ ¡ ¹. Consequently
the solution to program (7) would be decreasing with ¸, then increasing, as
depicted on Figure 1. In that case, it is clear that sophisticates consume
8
more than naives, while the opposite would be true if @X=@c1 was negative.
Hence the sign of @X=@c1 controls the comparative statics analysis.7
To sign this term, we need to introduce the following de…nitions used in
the precautionary savings literature. For an increasing and concave function
uj, consider the following indexes:
Aj(c) = ¡u
00
j (c)
u0j(c)
Pj(c) = ¡u
000
j (c)
u00j (c)
:
The …rst index is the well-known Arrow-Pratt’s coe¢cient for absolute risk-
aversion. The second index is called the absolute prudence, and measures the
propensity to increase savings when future income becomes riskier (Kimball,
1990).
We can now state our main result which is proven in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 The lack of self-control reduces (resp. increases) current
savings for any (w, R, ¹) if and only if both u2 and u3 verify the following
condition:
8 c Pj(c) ¡ 2Aj(c) ¸ 0 (resp. < 0); j = 2; 3:
Proposition 1 shows that the qualitative e¤ect of a change in ¸ is con-
trolled by the second and third derivatives of the utility functions and does
not depend on whether preferences are present-biased (¸ < ¹) or future-
biased (¸ > ¹). The proof makes it clear that this condition also ensures a
7Moreover, observe that X does not depend on ¹. This indicates that the impact of
self-control does not depend on whether preferences are present-biased or future-biased.
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monotonicity property: the proposition holds as well as ¸moves away from ¹.
In other words, if prudence is lower than twice risk-aversion savings increase
when the problem of self-control becomes more severe, while the opposite
is true if the condition is reversed (see Figure 1 for an illustration). Our
intuition for that result is the following.
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE.
First denote
U(c1; c2; ¹) = u1(c1) + u2(c2) + ¹u3(w ¡R2c1 ¡Rc2); (8)
so that the sophisticate’s objective is to maximize U(c1; c2(c1; ¸); ¹) over c1
where c2(c1; ¸) is given in (6). The …rst order condition simply gives
@c2
@c1
(c1; ¸) = ¡U1U2 (c1; c2(c1; ¸); ¹); (9)
where Ui denote partial derivatives of U .8
Note that the right-hand-side of the previous equation is simply the slope
of indi¤erence curves at (c1; c2(c1; ¸)). On Figure 2, indi¤erence curves are
represented in the plane (c1; c2) by ellipses around the optimal naive’s con-
sumption point N . For a given ¸; the sophisticate’s optimal consumption is
then given by S, i.e. the point (c1; c2(c1; ¸)) characterized by the tangency
condition (9).
8Equation (9) is nothing else than the modi…ed Euler equation (Harris and Laibson,
2001), i.e., u01(c1) = Ru03(w ¡ R2c1 ¡ Rc2(c1; ¸))[(¹ ¡ ¸)@c2@c1 (c1; ¸) + ¹R]:
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This graph makes it clear that the way S reacts to a change in ¸ is con-
trolled by the change of the slope of the indi¤erence curves ¡U1=U2 compared
to the change of self-2’s marginal propensity to consume @c2=@c1. The …rst
e¤ect on ¡U1=U2 indicates that when ¸ changes the rate of marginal substi-
tution between period 1 and period 2’s consumption changes as well. This is
only because any change in ¸ changes the point (c1; c2(c1; ¸)) at which this
marginal rate of substitution ¡U1=U2 is computed. This e¤ect thus captures
how self-1’s preferences over (c1; c2; w ¡ R2c1 ¡ Rc2) changes as c2 changes.
This e¤ect is controlled by the second derivative of the utility functions.
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE.
Yet, there is a second e¤ect, that is the e¤ect on self-2’s marginal propen-
sity to consume. Indeed, when ¸ changes, not only does c2 change, but the
way self-2 splits any unit of self-1’s savings changes. This e¤ect is controlled
by both the second and the third derivatives of the utility functions. Propo-
sition 1 thus gives the necessary and su¢cient condition to compare these
two e¤ects, which actually depends on the coe¢cient of prudence compared
to the coe¢cient of absolute risk aversion. Figure 2 actually represents a case
where prudence is lower than twice absolute risk aversion so that period 1’s
consumption decreases with a radial increase in ¸.
Proposition 1 thus provides a strong generalization of Pollack (1968)’s
result. Indeed integrating the condition P ¡ 2A = 0 gives the logarithmic
utility functions, u(x) = log x. Thus among the class of all increasing and
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concave utility functions, the logarithmic utility function is the only one such
that the naives and sophisticates’ consumption levels coincide. More gener-
ally, within the Constant Relative Risk Aversion class of utility functions,
we have P ¸ 2A if and only if the relative risk aversion parameter is be-
low 1. This level for relative risk aversion is generally recognized as low for
households.9
Note also that the condition P ¸ 2A is stronger than the condition of
Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion (DARA), which is actually equivalent to
P ¸ A: Debreu and Koopmans (1982) argue that a mathematical measure of
risk aversion is the following “concavity index” ¡u00(u0)2 . It turns out that with
the Debreu and Koopmans’ index, decreasing absolute risk aversion reduces
to P ¸ 2A. In this case only, undersaving may be viewed as a natural
consequence of time-inconsistency.
Finally, an interesting implication of the condition on the utility function
derived in Proposition 1 is that it makes immediate the generalization of the
comparative statics to conditions of uncertainty. Suppose indeed that future
revenues are unknown, ew ´ w + e". Let de…ne the indirect utility function
v(x) = Eu3(x+ e");
and denote respectively Pv and Av for absolute prudence and absolute risk
9Recently, it has been shown that the sign of P ¡2A controls the comparative statics of
many decision problems under uncertainty. For example, in …nance, Gollier (2001) proved
that the sign of P ¡ 2A determines whether independent risky assets are substitutes or
complements (Proposition 36) or whether opening new risky investment opportunities
raises or reduces aggregate savings (Propositions 74 and 75). Alesina and Tabellini (1990)
obtained the same condition to characterize the budget de…cit policy under uncertainty.
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aversion of v. The point is that Carroll and Kimball (1996, Lemma 1) showed
that
P3 ¸ 2A3 implies Pv ¸ 2Av:
As a result, our condition is left unchanged when there is some uncertainty
on future revenues.
4 Generalized Preferences
Until now, we have investigated the e¤ect of self-control into the simple
canonical consumption model. This analysis has required the examination of
the sophisticate’s problem. Technically, we have thus studied the sensitivity
of a Stackelberg equilibrium to changes in a discount factor from ¹ to ¸. It
seems reasonable to think that this analysis has been made possible only due
to the strong regularity properties of the pure consumption model. In this
section, we show that the analysis extends to a broader class of models.
Consider the family of models taking the form of
max
c1;c2
U(c1; c2; ¹);
where c1 and c2 are respectively the …rst and second period decisions.10 As-
sume that the objective is concave in c2 and twice di¤erentiable in c1 and c2.
Here ¹ is interpreted as a discount factor, so U is assumed to be linear in ¹.
As before, we consider a change in future preferences from ¹ to ¸, so that
10This simply generalizes the previous model as written in (8).
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c2(c1; ¸) is characterized by
U2(c1; c2(c1; ¸); ¸) = 0: (10)
Now denote
H(c1; ¸; ¹) = U(c1; c2(c1; ¸); ¹);
for the objective to be maximized in the …rst period by the sophisticate.
Using this general notation, one can easily see that any change in parameter
¸ changes the current objective H(c1; ¸; ¹) only indirectly, i.e. only through
the e¤ect it has on the future decision. In other words, the e¤ect of self-
control can be properly investigated since a change in ¸ does not a¤ect current
preferences. Note that from (10) we have
H¸(c1; ¸; ¸) = 0: (11)
Now de…ne the naive’s objective as
V (c1; ¹) = H(c1; ¹; ¹):
The problem of comparing the …rst period decisions for naives and sophis-
ticates reduces now to comparing H1(c1; ¸; ¹) with V1(c1; ¹). We show in
appendix the following result:
Proposition 2 Assume that U(c1; c2; ¹) is linear in ¹. De…ne the value
function
V (c1; ¹) = max
c2
U(c1; c2; ¹):
The lack of self-control reduces c1 if and only if V1(c1; ¹) is concave in ¹:
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This proposition shows that the impact of self-control may be analyzed
without solving for the sophisticate’s problem. Only the naive’s problem has
to be examined, so that standard tools of dynamic decision theory, such as
the Envelope Theorem, may be used to investigate the comparative statics
of self-control.11
Now let us generalize the model to assume that there is uncertainty over
the future discount factor ¹. Note that the marginal value of increasing c1
under uncertainty is given by
EV1(c1; ¹);
which under concavity of V1 is less than the marginal value of increasing c1
when ¹ is known to take its mean value E¹,
V1(c1; E¹):
Hence the concavity of V1(c1; ¹) in ¹ also controls the e¤ect of uncertainty
on ¹ on c1. We have thus shown that the condition on preferences that is
necessary and su¢cient for c1 to decrease when a self-control problem is in-
troduced is also necessary and su¢cient for c1 to increase when uncertainty
on the discount factor ¹ is introduced. This helps to understand the appear-
ance of the coe¢cient of prudence as a key quantity to sign the comparative
statics analysis of self-control in a consumption model. We suggest that this
11In particular, when V (c1; ¹) = maxc2 u(c2) +¹u(w ¡R2c1 ¡Rc2) then ¡V1¹¹ has the
sign of P ¡ 2A. This illustrates how Proposition 2 extends Proposition 1.
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formal homology is due to the existence of two opposite e¤ects identi…ed in
the precautionary savings literature (Drèze and Modigliani, 1972). These
two e¤ects may be brie‡y presented as follows.12
Under uncertainty on ¹, the optimal response in period 2 is c2(c1; ¹):
Suppose now that the second period decision does not respond to uncer-
tainty, i.e. the decision is c2(c1; E¹): Anticipating this future decision rule
has two e¤ects on the …rst-period decision c1. First, since the future decision
is sub-optimal, this e¤ect is similar to a decrease in future revenues and it
increases in general the willingness to save under risk aversion. This is an
income e¤ect. But another e¤ect takes place, more in line with a substitution
e¤ect, or, say, a precautionary savings e¤ect. Any unit of savings which is
split according to the decision rule c2(c1; E¹) reduces the variability of future
revenues since it is insensitive to ¹. This e¤ect thus reduces in general the
precautionary savings motive under prudence.
Our analysis thus suggests that discount factors uncertainty is a candidate
to explain the observed low rate of savings by some households.13 The follow-
ing simple example illustrates this point. Consider our consumption model
12Related interpretations may be found in Epstein (1980) and Gollier, Jullien and Treich
(2000).
13A similar hypothesis is introduced by Sozou (1998) and Dasgupta and Maskin (2002)
to show how hyperbolic discounting may emerge due to uncertainty over discounting.
There exist two main di¤erences with our analysis though: …rst, these two papers consider
uncertainty over discount rates, not discount factors. Second, they do not allow for un-
certainty resolution over time while in our model the agent learns the value of ¹ at period
2.
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as presented in Section 2 and assume ¹ = R = w = 1 and u1 = u2 = u3 = u
with u(c) = ¡(1¡c)2. Perfect smoothing is optimal: the agent consumes 1/3
in period 1. Suppose, however, that one observes over-consumption today.
Then self-control problems cannot explain this observation. Indeed period 1
consumption equals ¸=(1 + ¸ + ¸2) which is always lower than 1/3 (this is
because for this quadratic utility function we have P = 0 < 2A). An alter-
native explanation would be to introduce uncertainty over future discount
factors, e.g., ¹+ = 1 + " or ¹¡ = 1 ¡ " with equal probability. Then period
1 consumption equals 1=(3 ¡ "2), which is indeed larger than 1/3, and thus
may explain the observed over-consumption. Similar e¤ects would arise with
the more traditional iso-elastic function u(c) = c1¡°=(1¡°), when ° is above
one.
To sum up, our analysis has shown that the relation between undersav-
ings and self-control problems is less clear than previously hypothesized by
economists. In particular, this relation critically depends on the consumer’s
utility function. Besides, our analysis has introduced a new hypothesis to
explain undersavings. Indeed, we have shown that savings decrease in re-
sponse to uncertainty over future discount factors, and the critical condition
on the utility function for this e¤ect to hold is the same as the one to sign
the e¤ect of self-control. Our analysis thus ends up with the question of
whether a more general time-consistent framework could not better explain
some empirical anomalies than the time-inconsistent framework.
17
5 Conclusion
In his Alfred Marshall’s lecture, Matthew Rabin indicated that “psychologi-
cally inspired models that allow the possibility of less-than-100% self control
(...) allow us to investigate the possibility that people under-save” (Rabin,
2002, p. 659). In this paper, we have tried to investigate this possibility,
namely to establish a connection between the absence of self-control and
undersavings in a model with non-exponential discounting.
We have shown that this connection is true only if the agent is prudent
enough. Intuitively, two e¤ects enter in the picture. First, less self-control
reduces the incentives to save since any unit of savings will be sub-optimally
allocated in the future. Under prudence, this e¤ect is similar to the e¤ect
of less uncertainty on future discount factors. However, since the future
consumption decision is sub-optimal, the e¤ect of a loss of self-control is also
comparable to a reduction in future revenues. This, in turn, increases the
willingness to save. Under usual assumptions on preferences, this last e¤ect
dominates, so that the lack of self-control could well lead to over-savings.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: We want to examine the sign of
@X=@c1 =
@
@c1
·
u023 (w ¡R2c1 ¡Rc2(c1; ¸))
u002(c2(c1; ¸)) + ¸R2u003(w ¡R2c1 ¡Rc2(c1; ¸))
¸
:
Using obvious notations, @X=@c1 has the sign of
¡2u003(R2 +R@c2@c1 )(u
00
2 + ¸R
2u003) ¡ u03(u0002 @c2@c1 ¡ ¸R
2u0003 (R2 +R
@c2
@c1
)):
>From (6), we use
@c2
@c1
=
¡¸R3u003
u002 + ¸R2u003
;
so that multiplying by ¡(u002 + ¸R2u003) > 0, we get
2u002u
00
3(u
00
2 + ¸R
2u003) ¡ u03(¸Ru0002 u003 + ¸R2u0003 u002):
Dividing by u002u003u03 > 0 yields
2(u002=u
0
3 + ¸R
2u003=u
0
3) ¡ ¸R(u0002 =u002 +Ru0003 =u003):
Using again u02 = ¸Ru03 gives
¡u0002
u002
+R
¡u0003
u003
¡ 2(¡u
00
2
u02
+R
¡u003
u03
)
so that, @X=@c1 has the same sign as
P2(c2) ¡ 2A2(c2) +R[P3(c3) ¡ 2A3(c3)]: (12)
Therefore the conditions given in the Proposition are su¢cient to sign the
change in current consumption due to a change in ¸, as explained in the text.
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Let us now turn to the necessity part. Suppose that at some (c2, c3), at
least one of the two conditions
P2(c2) ¸ 2A2(c2) P3(c3) ¸ 2A3(c3)
does not hold. Then for R > 0 well-chosen, (12) is negative, and therefore
@X=@c1 < 0. Now choose (c1, w, ¹) to verify the two optimality conditions
(5) and the budget constraint. Then (c1, c2, c3) is the unique solution to the
naive’s program, which is strictly concave. By a continuity argument, there
exists a ¸ (close enough to ¹) for which the sophisticate program (7) is also
strictly concave, and admits a unique solution. Since the cross-derivative has
the sign of (¸¡ ¹)@X=@c1, and @X=@c1 has just been shown to be negative,
we get that the solution to the sophisticate program increases, then decreases
with ¸. We thus have obtained a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 2: We want to compare the functions H1(c1; ¸; ¹)
and V1(c1; ¹). These functions share the same slope with respect to ¹ at
¹ = ¸. Indeed we have from (11)
V¹(c1; ¸) = H¹(c1; ¸; ¸);
so that
V1¹(c1; ¸) = H1¹(c1; ¸; ¸):
Hence, since the slopes are the same at ¹ = ¸ and since H1(c1; ¸; ¹) is linear
in ¹, it is immediate that we are done if we are able to sign the convexity
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of V1(c1; ¹) in ¹. For instance if V1(c1; ¹) is convex in ¹, then V1(c1; ¹) is
above H1(c1; ¸; ¹); and the naive chooses a higher c1 than the sophisticate.
Note that the convexity of V1(c1; ¹) provides also a necessary condition since
around ¹ = ¸; V1(c1; ¹) is above H1(c1; ¸; ¹) only if it is convex in ¹.
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C1(l)
l
C1(m)
m
Figure 1:
Period 1 consumption as a function of the discount factor ¸. Consumption
decreases with more self-control problem, that is with a radial increase of ¸:
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c1
c2
N
c2(c1, m)
S
c2(c1, l)
Sophisticate’s
consumption
Naive’s
consumption
u1’(c1)=Ru2’(c2)
c2(c1, l’)
l < m
l’ > m
Figure 2:
N characterizes the naive’s optimal consumption, i.e. the two Euler con-
ditions (5). S characterizes the sophisticate’s optimal consumption, i.e. con-
ditions (9). Ellipses represent indi¤erence curves of preferences (8). This
Figure sets a situation where the coe¢cient of prudence is lower than twice
the coe¢cient of absolute risk aversion, so that consumption decreases with
a radial increase of ¸.
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